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Extending the Fairness Principle of Li
and American Motorcycle: Adoption




The trend in California has been to make the tort system conform to
the basic principle of fairness enunciated in Li v. Yellow Cab Com-
pany;I "liability for damages must be borne by those whose negligence
caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault."2 However, at
present because of the traditional doctrine of joint and several liability3
one tortfeasor may have to bear a disproportionate share of plaintiff's
loss when another tortfeasor is insolvent or has settled for an amount
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, Cal., Copy-
right 1982.
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
2. Id at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
3. The original meaning for a 'Joint tort" was the concept of vicarious liability for concerted
action. All parties who acted in concert to commit a tort, in pursuance of a common plan or
design, were held liabl e enr e result. Each party was liable for the sum of the entire
damage done, although his part in the plan may have only contributed to a fraction of the loss
sustained. Under the modern liberal American Rule as to joinder, defendants whose negligence
has concurred to produce a single loss to the plaintiff have been joined to one action, and under a
standard which Dean Prosser refers to as a "careless usage," have been called joint tort-feasors.Once labeled as joint tort-feasors, each defendant is held jointly and several y liable for the entire
loss. W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§46-47 (4th Ed. 1971). See infra notes 19-36 and accom-
panying text.
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less than his proportional share. Prior to Li, fairness was not the prime
concern in determining liability. A plaintiff who was found to be con-
tributorily negligent could not recover from the defendant even if the
defendant was overwhelmingly more negligent than the plaintiff.4 The
plaintiff was forced to bear the burden of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct. There were other areas in which it was necessary for one party to
bear the burden of another's wrongful conduct. Assumption of risk
was also a complete bar to recovery.5 By statute, contribution among
tortfeasors was on a pro rata basis regardless of the proportion of the
damages which could be attributed to each defendant. 6 Equitable in-
demnity was awarded on an all-or-nothing basis; the tortfeasor who
was found to be primarily liable would have to bear the burden of the
entire loss in spite of a significant contribution by the secondary
tortfeasor to the plaintiffs injuries.7
Because of Li and the cases which have followed it, these inequities
have been resolved and the principle of fairness is firmly entrenched in
the California tort system. Li, of course, established comparative negli-
gence abolishing the all-or-nothing contributory negligence.8 Li
merged that form of assumption of risk which is also negligence into
the comparative negligence doctrine.9 American Motorcycle Association
v. Superior Court circumvented the contribution statute and established
what might be called comparative partial indemnity which apportions
the payment of damages among the defendants.10
4. Baltimore & P.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439 (1877); Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183,
288 P.2d 12 (1955). The rule was rooted in the long-standing principle that one should not recover
from another for damages brought upon oneself. See generall, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §467 (1977).
5. The theory behind the defense was that the defendant's conduct involves certain dangers
or risks, which the plaintiff voluntarily accepts. See Morton v. California Sports Car Club, 163
Cal. App. 2d 685, 329 P.2d 967 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §496A (1977).
6. Contribution was "limited to the excess so paid over the pro rata share of the person so
paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his own
pro rata share of the entire judgment." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §875(c). The pro rata share of
each defendant was determined by "dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them." Id
§876(a); see Rollins v. California, 14 Cal. App. 3d 160, 92 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1971).
7. The rationale underlying the principle of indemnity was that "everyone is responsible for
the consequences of his own wrong, and if others have been compelled to pay damages which
ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from him." Herrero v. Atkinson, 227
Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490. 493 (1964).
8. In abolishing contributory negligence, the court noted that "this reexamination leads us
to the conclusion that the 'all-or-nothing' rule of contributory negligence can be and ought to be
superseded by a rule which assesses liability in proportion to fault." Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532
P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (the court went on to adopt "pure" comparative negligence as
the law to be applied in California).
9. "Mhe defense of assumption of risk is also abolished to the extent that it is merely a
variant of the former doctrine of contributory negligence; [and is] to be subsumed under the gen-
eral process of assessing liability in proportion to negligence." 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 875; Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
10. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). The court held that the common
law doctrine should be modified to permit partial indemnity among concurrent tort-feasors on a
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The only vestige of the pre-Li period is the doctrine of joint and
several liability and the effect that doctrine has upon situations involv-
ing multiple defendants. The doctrine requires that a solvent tortfeasor
pay the entire judgment even though his proportional share of the fault
was far less than that of an insolvent defendant or one who had settled
earlier with the plaintiff. Contribution and indemnity, which normally
protect one tortfeasor from bearing the burden of another's liability, do
not work against an insolvent tortfeasor or against a solvent one who
has settled with plaintiff and is therefore protected by the laws gov-
erning release. The solvent tortfeasor is required to bear the burden of
the insolvent or settling tortfeasor even if the plaintiff has contributed
to his own injuries in a greater proportion than the solvent tortfeasor.II
The inequity of the law as it stands is shown in a recent case which
reached the appellate court level. 2 Although this case was subse-
quently "unpublished" by the California Supreme Court,13 the facts
are still significant. Following a somewhat routine automobile "fender
bender," plaintiff settled with defendant A for $4000 and continued to
prosecute his suit against B who in turn cross-complained against A for
contribution and indemnity. At trial, the jury by special verdict set de-
fendant A's share of the fault at eighty percent and defendant B's share
at twenty percent. The total amount of damages was found to be
$19,700.14 The trial court continued to hear the case without the jury.
The court found the settlement between plaintiff and A to have been
made in good faith, and so the court deducted the amount of the settle-
ment from plaintiff's damages 15 and ordered B to pay the remaining
amount of $15,700.16 Because Code of Civil Procedure section 877(b)
bars contribution from a settling tortfeasor, defendant B had to bear
the burden of the entire judgment less the amount of settlement. 17
Thus a defendant who was twenty percent liable had to pay eighty per-
cent of the damages. The inequity of the result was amplified in this
particular case because defendant A was the wife of the plaintiff and
would share in his recovery against defendant B. However, the unfair-
comparative fault basis. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975);
Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974); Gomes J. Brodhurst, 344 F.2d 465
(3rd Cir. 1967); cf. Lindenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
11. See infra note 173.
12. Baget v. Shepard, 128 Cal. App. 3d 433 (1982) Reporter of Decisions directed not to
publish this opinion in the Official Reports, by the authority of the CAL. CONST. art. VI, §14; CAL.
R. CT. Div. III Rule 976. The opinion of such a case shall not be cited by a court or a party to an
action or preceding, except in very limited circumstances. See CAL. R. CT. Div. III Rule 977.
13. See supra note 12.
14. 128 Cal. App. 3d at 436 (unpublished opinion).
15. Id. at 438 (unpublished opinion).
16. Id
17. Id. at 438-39 (unpublished opinion).
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ness in this situation does not rest upon the quirk of fate that plaintiff
and defendant A were married; rather there is an inherent injustice in
one defendant having to pay damages far in excess of his proportional
liability.
In one sense, the injustice is even greater in situations involving in-
solvent defendants. For if defendant A, who is insolvent, is eighty per-
cent at fault and defendant B is twenty percent at fault, defendant B,
under the present rule ofjoint and several liability, will have to pay one
hundred percent of the damages despite having been found liable for
1/5 that amount. The unfairness created by joint and several liability
takes other forms as well. Two examples, the second more unfair than
the first, involving an insolvent defendant, are appropriate here. In the
first, plaintiff is ten percent at fault, defendant A, who is insolvent, sev-
enty percent, and defendant B twenty percent. Defendant B pays
ninety percent of the damages. In the second, plaintiff is twenty per-
cent at fault, defendant A, who is again insolvent, seventy percent, and
defendant B ten percent. Defendant B is liable for eighty percent of the
damages. Although in these two hypotheticals the solvent defendant
will pay less out of pocket than he would if plaintiff were not liable, the
injustice still seems greater than when plaintiff is not at fault. It can at
least be said that between an innocent plaintiff and a culpable defend-
ant, the defendant should bear the risk of an insolvent co-defendant. 18
But when plaintiff is also at fault, and especially when plaintiff is more
at fault than the solvent defendant, this rationale loses all meaning. A
defendant should not have to bear the entire risk of an insolvent co-
defendant when plaintiff is also culpable.
The thesis of the present article is that the harsh and unfair effect of
the doctrine of joint and several liability should be judicially or legisla-
tively modified by the adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
The sections which follow will examine: (1) the nature and origins of
the present law; (2) the fairness principle of Li and American Motorcy-
cle and why it dictates modification; (3) the arguments raised inAmeri-
can Motorcycle for not abolishing the doctrine to the point of showing
that these arguments should not govern the issue of modification;
(4) the case law and legislation of other jurisdictions; and (5) the ways
in which modification can be made.
18. The reason for imposing liability on each for the entire consequence is that there
exists no basis for dividing damages and the law is loath to permit an innocent plaintiff
to suffer as against a wrongful defendant.
20 Cal. 3d at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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I. BACKGROUND
In order to resolve the problems created by the continuing existence
of the doctrine of joint and several liability, it will be necessary to ex-
amine not only the doctrine itself but also the laws which govern con-
tribution and release. Indeed, as will be discussed later, one of the
ways to ameliorate the unfair effect of joint and several liability is to
modify the law governing contribution.
.4 Joint and Several Liability
Perhaps a better name for the doctrine of joint and several liability is
"entire liability" because under the doctrine each tortfeasor is "liable
for the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff.' 19 In multi-defendant
cases, the practical effect of this rule is that if one tortfeasor is insolvent
or cannot be levied upon, or even if the plaintiff merely chooses not to
execute a judgment against one defendant, another tortfeasor can be
called upon to satisfy the entire judgment.20 If one tortfeasor has set-
tled, another may be called upon to pay the entire judgment less the
amount of settlement.2 The solvent or non-settling tortfeasor is liable
without regard to the proportional share of the injury which he
caused.22
Originally the rule of entire liability was applied only to those
tortfeasors who had acted in concert, true joint tortfeasors.3 But over
the centuries, it has come to be applied to tortfeasors who possessed a
common duty to the plaintiff; to tortfeasors who have a relationship
which causes one of them to be vicariously liable for the other's con-
duct; and to tortfeasors who act concurrently to cause a single, indivisi-
19. Prosser, Joint Torts and SeveralLiability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413,418 (1937); 1 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 692 (1956); Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F. Supp.
514 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
20. American MotorcycleAss'n., 20 Cal. 3d at 590,578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The
court stated that
one of the principal by-products of the joint and several liability rule is that it frequently
permits an injured person to obtain full recovery for his injuries even when one or more
of the responsible parties do not have the financial resources to cover their liability.
id
21. Wouldridge v. Zimmerman, 21 Cal. App. 3d 656, 98 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1971) ("[t]he purpose
of the rule requiring such reduction is to avoid double recovery and unjust enrichment which a
plaintiff would enjoy if he were able to collect part of his total claim from one, and all from
another.. ."); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §877 (release of one tortfeasor "shall not discharge any
other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claim against
others. . . in the amount of the consideration paid for it ... ").
22. 20 Cal. 3d at. 590, 578 P.2d at 906-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
23. Prosser, supra note 19, at 418; HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, at 692; Alexander v.
Hammarberg, 103 Cal. App. 2d 872, 230 P.2d 399 (1951). The former belief was that, to constitute
joint tort-feasors, there must be a concert of action, a unity of purpose or design, and two or more
defendants working separately but to a common purpose; each acting with the other's knowledge
and consent.
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ble injury.24
Tortfeasors are said to act in concert when they "act in pursuance of
a common plan or design." 2 It is not necessary for both tortfeasors to
actually commit the act that directly injures the plaintiff.26 Prosser
stated that concerted action includes all those who "actively participate
in the wrongful act, by cooperation or request, or who lend aid, encour-
agement or countenance to a wrongdoer, or approval to the acts for
their benefit . .. "27 The rationale for entire liability in this situation
has always been that, when defendants act in concert, the act of one
will be considered the act of all.28 Tortfeasors who do not act out a
common plan may still be considered joint if they have a common duty
toward the plaintiff imposed upon them by law. Most cases in this cat-
egory involve co-owners of property who negligently maintain some
aspect of the property--e.g., a building,29 a party wall,30 or even a
flowerpot. 3'
Joint and several liability is also imposed upon multiple-tortfeasors
when an agent or principal is held vicariously liable for the acts of a
24. Harper and James point out that these last two categories are not joint torts within the
true meaning of the words.
Strictly speaking, the words 'joint-tort' should be used only where the behavior of two or
more tort-feasors is such as to make it proper to treat the conduct of each as the conduct
of the others as well. In effect this requires the existence of a concert of action or the
breach of a joint duty.
HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, at 692. Prosser divides the joint torts into several more cate-
gories which are also incompassed in Harper and James' four: (1) concert of action; (2) vicarious
liability; (3) common duty; (4) concurrent causation of a single, indivisible result, which would
have caused alone; (5) successive injuries; (6) damages of the same kind, which it is difficult to
apportion; (7) acts innocent in themselves which together cause damage; and (8) alternate liability.
Prosser, supra note 19, at 429-43; see Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp. v. Nixen, 119 Cal.
App. 3d 417, 173 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (multiple parties under a common duty).
25. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, at 698 (1956); see Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116
P. 530 (1911) (newspaper proprietor gave his subordinates carte blanche to do anything to make
the paper a success); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §876 (1977).
26. HARPER AND JAMEs, supra note 19, at 698; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §876(a)(1977); Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 43 Cal. 2d 815,
279 P.2d 35 (1955); see also Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n., 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 79
Cal. Rptr. 543 (1969). The court, in distinguishing tort and criminal conspiracy, stated that in tort
the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in
the wrongful act responsible as a joint tort-feasor for all damages ensuing from the
wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree
of his activity.
Id at 176, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
27. "Express agreement is not necessary; all that is required is that there shall be a common
design or understanding." Prosser, supra note 19, at 429-30; cf. Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 278, 295 P.2d 113 (1956) (each participant in the wrongful act is responsible for all dam-
ages ensuing from the wrong regardless of the degree of his activity).
28. HARPER AND JAMEs, supra note 19, at 692; Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep.
1150 (1613) ("[w]ith all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of
all .... "). The origins of this view appear to be the same as those of the rationale for modem
criminal conspiracy. See Smithson v. Garth, 3 Lev. 324, 83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1691); see also Mox
Incorporated v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 262 P. 302 (1927).
29. Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897).
30. Simmons v. Everson, 124 N.Y. 319, 26 N.E. 911 (1891).
31. World v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938).
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servant or agent. Strictly speaking vicarious liability stems from the
agency doctrine of respondeat superior. However, although the agent
and principal have not committed a joint tort,32 both can be joined in
the same suit and both are subject to entire liability. Of course the
practical effect is that the master or principal usually must pay for the
full amount of the damages. 33
In terms of the thesis of this article, the most important application
ofjoint and several liability is to tortfeasors who concurrently cause an
indivisible injury to the plaintiff.34 The rationale for applying entire
liability to concurrent tortfeasors is largely a matter of causation. The
court stated inAmerican Motorcycle, "the principle that each tortfeasor
is personally liable for any indivisible injury of which his negligence is
the proximate cause has commonly been expressed in terms of joint
and several liability. 35 Concurrent tortfeasors are especially suscepti-
ble to unequal apportionment of responsibility. It is possible that one
tortfeasor's act alone would not have caused any harm to the plaintiff,
or that alone it might have caused the entire injury, or that it would
have caused a lesser injury.36
For most of the time that joint and several liability was developing,
the law was far more defendant oriented than it is today. Contributory
negligence and assumption of risk were absolute. There were no long
arm statutes to aid plaintiff in gaining jurisdiction. The practical
problems related to slower communication and transportation could
also work to protect defendants. Although the doctrine did not miti-
gate the harsh effects of contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk, it did help plaintiff when he or she could not gain jurisdiction or
when other practical problems prevented him or her from recovering
from one tortfeasor. The doctrine, of course, helped the plaintiff when
one defendant was insolvent. It should also be noted that during the
development of joint and several liability all plaintiffs who received a
judgment in their favor were entirely innocent in the eyes of the law.
Moreover, the concept of apportioning liability according to fault was
32. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, at 700 (1956). See generally W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN
AGENCY 65-105, 129-53, 220-79 (1949).
33. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, at 700. Obviously the servant or agent is not liable
for the tortious acts of the master or principal, unless other principles of joint tort liability would
make him so. The failure to impose any liability where the tort is the master's alone indicates that
the liability relationships are not truly joint torts.
34. There may have been a safety valve in the English system. Since under English law there
was no joinder of defendants unless there was concerted action, concurrent tortfeasors were tried
separately. Thus, the jury could apportion the damages to the portion of the injury the defendant
caused. More liberal American rules allowed joinder of concurrent tortfeasors, and this meant
that "a verdict for one sum [was] returned against all those found liable, without regard to the fact
that the juries in separate actions would not be so bound." Prosser, supra note 19, at 420.
35. 20 Cal. 3d at 586, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
36. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, at 702.
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non-existent or at least unaccepted. When judges were confronted with
the issue of who should bear the burden of the damages caused by an
insolvent tortfeasor, they had no means to apportion the loss. There-
fore, if the choice was between the totally innocent plaintiff and the
culpable solvent defendant, the answer was easy: the culpable defend-
ant should bear the burden and pay the whole judgment. This view is
expressed in a leading California case supporting the doctrine:
Even though persons are not acting in concert, if the result(s) pro-
duced by their acts are indivisible, each person is held liable for the
whole .... The reason for imposing liability on each for the entire
consequence is that there exists no basis for dividing damages and
the law is loath to permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer as against a
wrongdoing defendant.37
B. Contribution
Contribution is a method of allocating the loss among concurrent
tortfeasors. Since the doctrine of joint and several liability will make
each of them liable for the entire judgment, the one who satisfies the
entire judgement or a disproportionate share may seek contribution
against the others. It is often stated that there was no common law
right to contribution.38 However, this statement is not historically ac-
curate. The original rule against contribution was stated in a conver-
sion case, 39 and the rationale was that "plaintiff's claim rested upon
what was, in the eyes of the law, entirely his own deliberate wrong."40
Following this case, contribution was sometimes applied in negligence
cases in both England and the United States on the grounds that the
rule against contribution applied only to intentional torts. It was not
until "the door was thrown open to joinder" that the American courts
began to apply widely the rule against contribution."' Yet, according
to Prosser, eight states still allowed contribution in negligence cases
without the aid of a statute.42
Despite this common law authority for contribution, most states have
37. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950).
38. "Although early common law decisions established the broad rule that a tortfeasor was
never entitled to contribution. ... American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal,
3d 578, 592, 578 P.2d 899, 908, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 191 (1978). "At common law there is no right
of contribution between persons jointly or severally liable in tort ... " 4 B. WiTKI, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2344 (8th ed. 1979).
39. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
40. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 305.
41. Id at 306.
42. Id; see Knell v. Feltman, 85 App. D.C. 22, 174 F.2d 662 (1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa
800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289 (1933); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292,
192 A.2d 24 (1963); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887); Goldman v. Mitchell-
Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 19 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d
355 (1950); Ellis v. Chicago and N.W.R. Co., 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
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established contribution by statute.43 One of the strongest forces in
bringing about statutory change was the Uniform Contribution Acts of
1939" and 1955.41 Both of the Acts recommended a pro rata division
of the loss: each defendant's share is determined by dividing the
number of defendants who have been found liable into the amount of
the judgment.46  Thus each defendant's share was equal, and no at-
tempt was made to apportion liability according to fault. California
adopted a contribution statute allowing for pro rata shares,47 and it was
this statute that the court circumvented in American Motorcycle by es-
tablishing comparative partial indemnity, which allowed the courts to
apportion the contribution share according to the fault.48 If the statute
had not stood as a road block, the Supreme Court would not have had
to use the common law doctrine of indemnity, which traditionally did
not allow any sharing of the liability among tortfeasors, as a vehicle to
apportion liability among tortfeasors.49
C. Release
Release is simply the "surrender of a cause of action, which may be
gratuitous or for inadequate consideration." 0 A problem developed
early on because release was confused with satisfaction, which is the
43. Prosser stated that there were 23 states which had adopted a contribution statute in 1971.
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 307.
44. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939).
45. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975) (1955 version).
46. One of the major differences between the two uniform acts is the manner in which they
treat the settling tortfeasor. Under the 1939 act there was no release granted to the settling
tortfeasor who would still be liable for contribution. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
ACT §2 (1939). See infra note 144. This provision, because it discouraged settlement, was unpop-
ular and lead to the enactment of the 1955 act which allowed for the full release of the settling
tortfeasor as a means of encouraging settlement. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsORs
ACT 4b, 12 U.L.A. 99 (1975).
47. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §877(a).
48. American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578 P.2d 899,
912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 196 (1978).
In order to attain such a system, in which liability for an indivisible injury caused by
concurrent tortfeasors will be borne by each individual tortfeasor 'indirect proportion to
[his] respective fault,' we conclude that the current equitable indemnity rule should be
modified to permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity from other con-
current tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.
Id The Supreme Court held that the contribution statute did not prevent modification of the
common law doctrine of equitable indemnity because "in enacting the 1957 contribution legisla-
tion the Legislature did not intend to prevent the judiciary from expanding the common law
equitable indemnity doctrine ... ." Id at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
49. A suit for contribution is brought for the recovery of a proportionate part of the sum
paid by the plaintiff, on the ground that the parties were both equally guilty of negli-
gence and should share the cost .... A suit for indemnity is brought to recover the total
amount of the payment by the plaintiff, on the ground that the plaintiff's conduct was not
as blameworthy as the defendant's. ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT, §886b comment a.
50. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 301.
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"acceptance of full compensation for the injury."'5 ' Courts held that
the release of one tortfeasor was the release of all.5 2 This problem was
circumvented with the development of the "covenant not to sue" which
by definition released only the tortfeasor who was a party to the cove-
nant. 3 Ultimately the most sensible approach prevailed: a release of
one tortfeasor would not discharge any other tortfeasors. This position
was adopted by the Uniform Contribution Act of 1955,54 by California
in 195755 and by the Second Restatement. 56
It is important to note the effect of release on contribution. If a set-
tlement is made in return for a release, the general view is that the
released party is free from any further contribution and the amount of
the settlement is deducted from the amount of the judgment which the
remaining tortfeasors must pay.57 The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act of 1939 took the opposite view, that the released
tortfeasor could still be liable for contribution in the amount that his
pro rata share exceeds his settlement. 58  Although at least five states
accepted this view at one time, 9 it is now widely disfavored. However,
as will be discussed below, this position may provide one solution to
the problem this article addresses.6"
I. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: THE CASE FOR MODIFICATION
The fundamental reason for the modification of joint and several lia-
bility is that the present system unfairly favors plaintiffs over defend-
51. Id
52. "Until quite recent years, most of the courts have continued to hold that a release to one
of two concurrent tortfeasors is a complete surrender of any cause of action against the other, and
a bar to any suit against him, without regard to the sufficiency of the compensation actually re-
ceived." In California the rule was well settled that the release of one joint tortfeasor discharged
them all. E.g., Markwell v. Swift & Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 245, 272 P.2d 47 (1954); Flynn v.
Manson, 19 Cal. App. 400, 126 P. 181 (1912). There were cases which applied this rule to concur-
rent tortfeasors. Eg., Hadden v. Moran, 104 Cal. App. 2d 777, 232 P.2d 544 (1951); Hawber v.
Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701,268 P. 943 (1928). However, the California cases use the joint liability so
loosely ("making no distinction between strict joint tortfeasors and other jointly and severally
liable") that one commentator has stated the the Supreme Court had still left "open the question
as to concurrent tortfeasors." 4 Witkin, supra note 38, at 2336.
53. Holtz v. United Plumbing Co., 49 Cal. 2d 501, 319 P.2d 617 (1957); Kincheloe v. Retail
Credit Co., 4 Cal. 2d 21, 46 P.2d 971 (1935); Beck v. Bel Air Properties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286
P.2d 503 (1955); Abbott v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 116 Cal. App. 665, 3 P.2d 56 (1931).
54. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsORs ACT §4(a), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
55. CAL. CM. PROC. CODE §877(a).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §886A.
57. If it is clear that the satisfaction received was understood to be only partial, it should
not discharge the claim against a second tortfeasor. All courts are agreed, however, that
it must be credited pro tanto to diminish the amount of damages recoverable against
hin.. ..
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 304-05; accord, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §877(a).
58. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToiTFEAsoRs ACT §2 (1939).
59. Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Adams, Settlements
After Lk But Is It Fair, 10 PAC. LJ. 729, 744, n.104.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 147-174.
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ants. The fairness principle requires that loss should be apportioned
according to the percentage of fault.6 However, because of joint and
several liability, a defendant's liability may be based not on propor-
tional fault but rather on the solvency of codefendants 62 or on the will-
ingness of the plaintiff to settle with another defendant. L; American
Motorcycle, and the cases which follow them firmly establish the fair-
ness principle in California tort law. Although none of these cases, ex-
cept American Motorcycle which refused to abolish the doctrine, have
discussed changing the law to negate the harsh effect of joint and sev-
eral liability, these cases form the foundation for the argument that this
change must be made.
A. Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
The concept of fairness is the guiding principle of Li: fairness is the
foundation for comparative negligence, and it 1lays an important role
in the resolution of other issues. When the California Supreme Court
established comparative negligence, it used strong language. The court
was critical of contributory negligence because "the doctrine is inequi-
table in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in pro-
portion to fault."63 The court noted that juries often try to correct the
unfairness of contributory negligence in the jury room 4 and that this
unfairness undermines confidence in the legal system.65 The court's ac-
tual holding is couched in terms of fundamental fairness:
We are likewise persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fun-
damental justice counsel against the retention of the doctrine render-
ing contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery-and that
it should be replaced in this state by a system under which liabiliyfor
damages will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct
proportion to their respective fault.66
61. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
62. See Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American Motorcycle Association v. Supe-
rior Court, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1 (1978).
63. 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862. Dean Prosser states the kernel
of critical comment in these terms: "It [the rule] places upon one party the entire burden of a loss
for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible." PROSSER, supra note 3, §67, at 433. Harper and
James express the same basic idea:
[T]here is no justification-in either policy or doctrine-for the rule of contributory neg-
ligence, except for the feeling that if one man is to be held liable because of his fault,
then the fault of him who seeks to enforce that liability should also be considered. But
this notion does not require the all-or-nothing rule, which would exonerate a very negli-
gent defendant for even the slight fault of his victim. The logical corollary of the fault
principle would be a rule of comparative or proportional negligence, not the present rule.
2 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 19, §22.3 at 1207; 13 Cal. 3d at 810-11 n.3, 532 P.2d at 1230-31,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
64. 13 Cal. 3d at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
65. Id at 812, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
66. Id at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 (emphasis added).
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The court's view that fairness should govern the tort system was so
strong that it ignored a century-old interpretation of Civil Code section
•1714 which established contributory negligence in California.6 7 More-
over, the court chose the pure form of comparative negligence which
"apportioned liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases' 68 be-
cause the other form "also distorts the very principle it recognizes, i.e.,
that persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their faults con-
tribute to the injurious results."69 The court even allows a limited form
of retroactivity because of "considerations of fairness. .. .
B. American Motorcycle
Although the Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court refused to abolish the doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility, this case is a major application of the fairness principle.71 Be-
cause Li involved only one plaintiff and one defendant, the court
reserved the issue of the application of comparative negligence to cases
involving multiple tortfeasors until such a case was actually before the
court. 72 American Motorcycle Association presented the facts which al-
lowed the court to resolve the issues connected with multiple parties.73
InAmerican Motorcycle a minor received serious injury in a motorcycle
race sponsored by the Association. The minor sued the Association
which filed an answer and sought to file a cross-complaint against the
minor's parents. 74 The Association argued that it should only be re-
sponsible for its proportional share of the damages on two grounds:
first, that joint and several liability should be abolished and, second,
that there should be contribution or indemnity in proportion to fault.7 5
Although the Supreme Court refused to abrogate joint and several lia-
bility, the Court, in order to further establish the system of tort liability
envisioned in Li in which liability is allocated in direct proportion to
fault,76 modified its traditional, all-or-nothing aspect of equitable in-
67. California Civil Code section 1714 states in part that:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his
property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases in defined by the
Title on Compensatory Relief.
68. 13 Cal. 3d at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
69. Id at 828. 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
70. Id at 830, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. 876.
71. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
72. Justice Sullivan noted that "[p]roblems of contribution and indemnity among joint
tortfeasors lurk in the background." 13 Cal. 3d at 823, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
73. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
74. Id at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
75. Id
76. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
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demnity and established what might be called comparative partial in-
demnity allowing "a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity
from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis."77
The Supreme Court made it clear that the reason for establishing
comparative partial indemnity was the fairness principle. The Court
noted that the courts in general have abandoned traditional grounds
for the application of equitable indemnity,78 basing further applica-
tions of the doctrine on the grounds of equity and good conscience.79
The language of the court leaves no doubt that the principle of fairness
is the basis for the court's action:
[T]he all-or-nothing aspect of the doctrine has precluded courts from
reaching a just solution in the great majority of cases in which equity
and fairness call for apportionment of loss between wrongdoers in
proportion to their relative culpability, rather than the imposition of
the entire loss upon one or the other tortfeasor
8 0
The Court not only established comparative partial indemnity, it also
circumvented the legislatively mandated contribution statute 81 which
limits contribution to those against whom there is a joint judgment 2
and which requires that contribution be made on a pro rata basis.83
Evidently the court felt comfortable in circumventing this legislation
because the statute itself states that "the right of contribution shall be
administered in accordance with principles of equity."84 The Court in-
77. 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
78. Id at 591-98, 578 P.2d at 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. 190-95. The formulations for determin-
ing the proper applications of equitable indemnity were vague. Some authorities characterized
the negligence on the part of the indemnitor as "active," "primary," or "positive," and the negli-
gence of the indemnitee as "passive," "secondary," or "negative." These formulations were criti-
cized as artificial and "lacking the objective criteria desirable for predictability in the law." Id at
594, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192; see Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. LanCranco, 267 Cal.
App. 2d 881, 886, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1968).
79. Some courts have abandoned the welter of inconsistent standards and have turned to
equity:
The duty to indemnify may arise, and indemnity may be allowed in those fact situations
where in equity and good conscience the burden of thejudgment should be shftedfrom the
shoulders of theperson seeking indemnity to the onefrom whom indemnity is sought. The
right depends upon the principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his
own wrong, and if others have been compelled to pay damages which ought to have been
paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from him. Thus the determination of whether
or not indemnity should be allowed must of necessity depend upon the facts of each case.
20 Cal. 3d at 595, 578 P.2d at 909-10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93 (quoting from Herrero v. Atkinson,
227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1964).
80. 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§875-79.
82. Id §875(c). The section provides in part that liability "shall be limited to the excess paid
over the pro rata share of the person so paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled
to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire judgment." Id
83. "Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has, by payment,
discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §875(c).
84. Id at §875(b) (quoted inAmerican Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 602, 578 P.2d at 915, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 198).
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terpreted this provision to mean that the legislature intended the courts
to elaborate on these principles.85 By this interpretation the Court is
placing the principles of equity and fairness in almost a supreme posi-
tion: not only do these principles justify comparative partial indemnity
but they show that the legislature also seeks to embody these principles
in the ultimate tort system which results after judicial interpretation.
C Casesfollowing Li and American Motorcycle
The importance attached to the fairness principle by the Supreme
Court of California and the courts of appeal, can be seen in the expan-
sion of comparative partial indemnity to situations not discussed in
American Motorcycle. The first step in this expansion occurred several
months after American Motorcycle. In Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart,86
the Supreme Court held that comparative partial indemnity justified
the apportionment of damages between a negligent tortfeasor and one
who was strictly liable. The court used language which makes clear the
reason for applying comparative partial indemnity to this situation:
"even when an injury was in part caused by a defective product, fair-
ness and good social policy. . . dictated a sharing or apportionment of
liability. 87
Perhaps the most important expansion of American Motorcycle is the
application of comparative partial indemnity to a settling tortfeasor. In
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. International Harvester Co. ,8 the court of
appeal held that a settling tortfeasor could seek indemnification for a
portion of the settlement from a cross-defendant. Comparative indem-
nity has also been applied to governmental entities,89 to employees in
85. 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
86. 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
87. Id at 329, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (emphasis added). The court proceeded
to quote from Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702(1971), in which the court expressed discontent with traditional equitable indemnity doctrines
which would permit the dealer and leasing agency to escape any liability whatsoever surrounding
an accident relating to a defective automobile. The Poeschl court noted:
The dealer and the leasing agency shared Ford's ability to reach the customer before the
accident occurred ... on the assumption that they did nothing, their escape from
financial responsibility is troublesome. Judicially favored objective of deterrence and
accident prevention would be promoted by imposing some liability on a dealer who
knew of a danger and did nothing. To shift the entire loss to him would not serve these
objectives, for then the manufacturer would escape scot-free. A wise rule of law-one
designed to stimulate responsibility throughout the merchandising chain-would require
both parties to share the loss. A rule of... partial indemnifcation would permit that
result.
21 CaL 3d at 330, 579 P.2d at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
88. 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
89. Wagner v. State of California, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1978) (holding a
governmental entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property). The court
allowed a cross complaint by a defendant against the state seeking contribution in proportion to
the state's fault.
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workers' compensation cases,90 and to contractual indemnity.9
III. THE CONCERNS OF AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE AssoCIATIoN
In American Motorcycle, the California Supreme Court upheld the
doctrine of joint and several liability.92 The court is forthright and
unequivocal on this matter, and indeed, the fact that the court chose to
"unpublish" the appellate court decision in Baget v. Shepard93 shows
that the court is firm in its resolve to maintain the doctrine. However,
the court limits its discussion to the subject of abrogation of the doc-
trine; no mention is made of the possibility that joint and several liabil-
ity could be modified to remove the inequity which presently exists.
The reasons which justif-y the court's refusal to abolish joint and several
liability are not entirely satisfactory. As one commentator has noted,
the court "got lost in a maze of conceptualism. . . .94 Even if the
court's rationale for not abrogating joint and several liability are valid,
they do not justify a refusal to modify the inequitable effect of the
doctrine.
This failure to discuss modification can, of course, be attributed to
the failure of counsel to seek modification. However, a more plausible
explanation is that the court of appeal chose to abolish the doctrine, 95
and the Supreme Court seems to be reacting to the appellate court.
Therefore the appellate court decision in American Motorcycle is im-
portant background for understanding the view of the Supreme Court
and the need for further action on this issue.
A. The Appellate Court Decision
Although the Supreme Court overruled 96 the court of appeal,97 the
goals of the two courts were similar. Both sought to mitigate the harsh
effects on defendants imposed by the "limited" forms of contribution
90. Associated Coast. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation, 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684,
150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978) (held that a concurrently negligent employer was entitled to a credit
against workers' compensation obligations to the extent which exceeds the proportional liability
that the employer would incur for indemnification of a third party tort-feasor under a comparative
system of tort responsibility allocated among multiple wrongdoers); accord Aceves v. Regal Pale
Brew. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979).
91. Kramer v. Cedu Foundation, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979) (indem-
nity may arise by virtue of express contractural language and such a right may also be found in
equitable considerations brought into play by constructual language not expressly dealing with
indemnification or by the equities involved in a particular case).
92. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
93. Baget v. Shepard, 128 Cal. App. 3d 433 (1982) (unpublished opinion, see supra note 12).
94. Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability on
the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HAsT. L.J.
1464, 1484 (1979).
95. 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977).
96. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
97. 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497.
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provided by the contribution statute9" and the doctrine of equitable in-
demnity.99 The statutory right to contribution awards contribution
only when there is a joint judgment'0° and apportions the award on a
pro rata basis without regard to the proportional amount of fault.' 0 '
The "complex system of equitable indemnity" provides recovery only
on an all-or-nothing basis.' 2
In its desire to remedy the inequity facing defendants, the court of
appeal, like the Supreme Court, was very much influenced by Li v. Yel-
low Cab; however, the court of appeal chose a different vehicle to right
the wrong. The court of appeal applied the fairness principle of Li
directly to the doctrine of joint and several liability. If the fairness
principle of Li dictates that the all-or-nothing aspect of contributory
negligence should be abolished, then so should the all-or-nothing effect
of joint and several liability. If the fairness principle requires that the
harsh results of contributory negligence be abolished, then so should
the harsh results of joint and several liability. If a plaintiff who is at
fault should only be liable in proportion to his fault, then the same
should be true for defendants.'
0 3
The court of appeal added another argument in favor of abrogating
joint and several liability. The court argued that the purpose of the tort
system was to shift the burden of loss from plaintiff to a social fund
made up of taxes and insurance. Li shifted the loss of a negligent
plaintiff to this fund. Since this social fund was already overburdened,
the fairness principle which was the basis for the shift should also be
used to unburden the fund. Plaintiff should also bear part of the bur-
den of an insolvent or settling tortfeasor.104
98. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§875, 876. Although dissatisfied with the present statutes, the
court of appeal stated that the "intrusion upon the fundamental principle of separation of powers
is one that should not be undertaken if it [could] be avoided." 65 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 504.
99. [T]he equitable indemnity doctrine originated in the common sense proposition that
when two individuals are responsible for a loss, but one is more culpable than the other,
it is only fair that the more culpable party should bear a greater share of the loss. Of
course, at the time the doctrine developed, the common law precepts precluded any at-
tempt to ascertain comparative fault; and as a consequence equitable indemnity, like
contributory negligence, developed as an all-or-nothing proposition.
20 Cal. 3d at 593, 578 P.2d at 908-09, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92; see City & County of S.F. v. Ho
Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958) (first application of equitable indemnity by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court).
100. California Code of Civil Procedure section §75(c) states: "Where a money judgment has
been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of
contribution among them as hereinafter provided."
101. See supra note 60.
102. See supra note 99.
103. "In a system where liability of several defendants concurrently causing an injury is based
upon fault, the conclusion is equally irresistible that the extent of the fault of each should govern
the extent of liability of each." 65 Cal. App. 3d at 701, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
104. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 703, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The court pointed out that the plaintiff
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B. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's emphatic refusal to abrogate the doctrine of
joint and several liability can perhaps be attributed to its reaction to the
approach of the court of appeal. The Supreme Court succeeds in par-
tially providing a solution to the inequity suffered by defendants. By
establishing comparative partial indemnity, the Court has modified the
system so that many defendants will only be liable in proportion to
fault. ' 5 However, this solution, without modification of joint and sev-
eral liability, still requires the defendant to bear the burden of an insol-
vent or settling tortfeasor alone.
The Court presented three arguments in support of its refusal to
abolish joint and several liability. First, the plaintiffs injury is indivisi-
ble; second, the plaintiffs conduct is not as tortious as defendant's; and
third, the present law allows injured persons to receive full recovery.
L The Indivisibility of the Injury
The first argument is that the injury by the plaintiff is indivisible,
therefore, each defendant should potentially bear the burden of the en-
tire loss: "In other words, the mere fact that it may be possible to as-
sign some percentage figure to the relative culpability of one negligent
defendant does not in anyway suggest that each defendant's negligence
is not the proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury.'' 0 6
This argument is, of course, contrary to Li. As Justice Clark pointed
out in his dissent, "plaintiff's negligence is also the proximate cause of
the entire indivisible injury,"'' 7 but this did not prevent the Li court
from repudiating the all-or-nothing solution. Indeed, it is only because
the injury is indivisible that liability can be apportioned between plain-
tiff and defendant as required in Li. If the injury were divisible, the
only sensible way to apportion damages would be according to who
caused each portion of the injury.
The better view would be that since the injury is truly indivisible, a
culpable plaintiff and defendant should share the burden of plaintiffs
injury. After all, the plaintiff is also the proximate cause of a single
indivisible injury.
would still be better off financially than he would have been prior to Li. The plaintiff will still
recover something, the only variable would be the proportion of the total damages.
105. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99. After a lengthy analysis of
the 1957 contribution statute the court determined that it was intended to lessen the harshness of
the former common law no-contribution rule. Finding nothing in the legislative history of the
statute indicating an attempt to foreclose future judicial development of the statute's purpose, the
court held that the common law equitable indemnity doctrine should be modified to permit partial
indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. Id
106. 20 Cal. 3d at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
107. Id at 611, 578 P.2d at 920, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
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Although this argument is used to support the continued existence of
joint and several liability, it is a better argument for modification of the
doctrine. If the indivisibility of the injury allows apportionment of the
loss between the culpable plaintiff and defendant, then the portion of
the loss which is unsatisfied because of the settlement or insolvency of
one tortfeasor should also be apportioned. The indivisibility of the in-
jury should not be used for plaintiffs in Li and against defendants when
it comes to the subject of modifying joint and several liability.
2 The Culpabilily of Plaintiff
As Justice Clark noted in his dissent, the second justification for joint
and several liability offered by the majority is really a two-fold argu-
ment dealing with the culpability of the plaintiff. 08 The first part of
this argument is that, although Li stated that parties should be liable in
proportion to fault, not all plaintiffs are culpable. While it is undoubt-
edly true that not all plaintiffs will be found to be culpable, this argu-
ment serves only to justify the rule of entire liability when applied to
situations involving a completely innocent plaintiff. However, since it
is of course possible to have one rule for innocent plaintiff and one rule
for culpable plaintiff, this argument actually favors modification of the
current law which allows both culpable and innocent plaintiffs alike to
use joint and several liability to the detriment of defendants.
In order to justify applying joint and several liability when theplain-
tffis also at fault, the Supreme Court makes a second argument based
on the plaintifs conduct. The Court states that the culpability of the
plaintiff is not "equivalent to that of a defendant."' 0 9 The degree of
plaintiff's culpability is less because plaintiff has only violated a duty to
protect himself, whereas defendant has violated a duty to prevent harm
to others. The Court argues that since the degree of culpability is less,
the rule of entire liability should be maintained.
There are several things wrong with this point of view. To begin,
quite often a plaintiff in injuring himself will have created a tremen-
dous risk of harm to others. Moreover, the scope of plaintiff's duty is
irrelevant. The Supreme Court itself in American Motorcycle pointed
out that the guiding principle is that "a tortfeasor is liable for any in-
jury of which his negligence is a proximate cause."'"t 0 It makes no dif-
108. Id at 611, 578 P.2d at 920-21, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
109. Id at 589, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. Reduced to its simplest terms, the
argument is that the conduct of the defendant is tortious, while the plaintiffs is not. See PROSSER,
supra note 3, §65, at 418.
110. 20 Cal. 3d at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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ference if plaintiff had a duty only to himself; it is enough that the
breach of the duty to himself caused this injury.
Finally, the language of the court makes it sound as if the court holds
the view that tort liability is based on the moral wrongfulness of de-
fendant's conduct. The court goes so far as to say that "the fact re-
mains that insofar as the plaintiffs conduct creates only a risk of self-
injury, such conduct, unlike that of a negligent defendant, is not tor-
tious." 1 The only reason the conduct is not tortious is that plaintiff
has not "wronged" anyone else. However, a more acceptable view of
tort law is that liability exists, not because of moral wrong, but because
someone's conduct is such that this person should pay for the damages
the conduct causes. In Li, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff, in
effect, did have to pay for injuries which he caused to himself. Regard-
ing the injury which plaintiff has caused himself, the plaintiff is not
culpable to a lesser degree or order, his culpability is exactly the same
as defendant's.1 2
3. Full Recovery for the Plaintf
The Court's final justification for joint and several liability is that "it
frequently permits an injured person to obtain full recovery for his in-
juries even when one or more of the responsible parties do not have the
financial resources to cover their liability."' 13 This position is laudable;
our tort system must take care of those who are injured. However, fair-
ness will often be violated in such a system which may make a
tortfeasor of relatively incidental fault pay the damages to a plaintiff
who is significantly at fault. Even with the laudable motive of taking
care of the injured, such a result is blatantly pro-plaintiff and only tena-
ble because it is assumed that defendant has insurance or in some other
way may be considered to have deep pockets. Does it seem proper for
a private individual to bankrupt himself or herself to cover injuries for
which the plaintiff was more responsible?
To some degree the court must reach this harsh result because its
discussion is limited to the subject of abrogation; it does not examine
the possibility of modifying the inequitable effect of joint and several
liability. However, there are other ways for society to fairly shift the
burden of loss. While it is true that the total abolition of joint and
several liability would shift the entire burden of an insolvent defendant
to the plaintiff, there are methods by which the risk can be apportioned
11. Id at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
112. Fleming, supra note 94.
113. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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between plaintiff and solvent defendant fairly." 4
4. The Unstated Reason
Perhaps the real reason for the court's decision is unstated, for there
is another justification for the court's refusal to abolish joint and sev-
eral liability. This reason is succinctly stated by Professor Fleming:
That rule is justified not by a one-sided preference for plaintiffs, but
by the very principle of evenhandedness between plaintiffs and de-
fendants enunciated in Li. It should therefore appeal to plaintiffs'
and defendants' bar alike on the grounds of fairness: the "several"
rule of the court of appeal inAmerican Motorcycle is unfairly skewed
against plaintiffs, whereas the supreme court's opinion carries the
seeds of unfairness for defendants. "5
The Supreme Court was confronted by a dilemma in determining the
fate of joint and several liability. The real issue was who should bear
the burden of the damages which are unsatisfied because one tortfeasor
was insolvent or had settled for an amount less than his portion of the
fault would justify his paying. If the court upheld joint and several
liability, the defendant would bear the burden exclusively. If the court
abrogated the doctrine, the plaintiff would bear the burden. As be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, the court chose the defendant, who at
least, is always culpable to bear the burden. Therefore, joint and sev-
eral liability was upheld.
The dilemma can be avoided entirely if the choice is not between the
continued existence or abrogation of joint and several liability. If the
issue is whether or not the doctrine should be modified so that plaintiff
and defendant equally bear the burden of the unsatisfied damages, the
answer is plain. The fairness principle of Li dictates modification.
IV. OTHER STATES
Although the Supreme Court chose not to abolish joint and several
liability for the reasons stated above, the court seemed to take heart
from the inability of the American Motorcycle Association to cite au-
thority in support of abrogation of the doctrine: "AMA has not cited a
single judicial author to support its contention that the advent of com-
parative negligence rationally compels the demise of the joint and
several liability rule."" 6 The Court also points out that the "over-
114. See infra note 173.
115. Fleming, supra note 94.
116. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (accordingly the court held that a
concurrent tortfeasor remained liable for the total amount of damage, diminished only propor-
tionally to the degree of negligence attributable to the person recovering).
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whelming majority of jurisdictions which have adopted comparative
negligence have retained the joint and several liability doctrine"17 and
cites a number of cases which refuse to abolish joint and several
liability." 18
While the court is certainly correct in its view that the great weight of
case authority is against the abrogation of the doctrine, the same can-
not be said regarding the subject of modification. None of the cases
cited by the Supreme Court fully deal with modification; only one men-
tions- it. These cases, therefore, have dubious precedential value re-
garding modification. Moreover, a number of states have legislated
either modification or abrogation.
A. The Cases Against the Abrogation of Joint and Several Liability
1. Those Cited by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court in American Motorcycle cited five cases to illus-
trate the proposition that all courts which have considered the matter
have refused to abrogate joint and several liability."t9 The court's use
of these cases makes an interesting study in its own right. One of these
strongly upholds the doctrine but does not discuss the subject of abro-
gation with anything near the thoroughness of the court in American
Motorcycle. One of them indirectly upholds the doctrine against a
challenge based upon comparative negligence. Another upholds joint
and several liability but no mention is made of comparative negligence.
And two of them, while upholding the doctrine of joint and several
liability, actually modify it.
Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co. 120 is the only case which lends
strong support for the position of the Supreme Court in American Mo-
torcycle. Kelly followed Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., the New York case
which allowed the apportionment of damages among contributing
tortfeasors according to proportional fault.' 2 1 In Kelly, the New York
Court of Appeal stated:
It should, of course, be understood that this refinement of the rule of
contribution does not apply to or change the plaintiff's right to re-
117. Id
118. Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940); Saucier v. Walker, 203 So. 2d
299 (Miss. 1967); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d
851 (1972); Chille v. Howell, 34 Wis. 2d 491, 149 N.W.2d 600 (1967); Walker v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
119. See supra note 118.
120. 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851.
121. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Damages were apportioned
among the joint or concurrent tortfeasors regardless of the degree or nature of the concurring
fault. The court in Kelly stated that "(wle believe the new rule of apportionment to be pragmati-
cally sound, as well as realistically fair." 31 N.Y.2d at 29, 286 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
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cover against any joint tort-feasor in a separate or common action
the total amount of his damages suffered and not compensated. We
are only concerned here with the right of contribution between two
or more joint or concurrent tort-feasors.122
This statement is all that is said in Kelly regarding joint liability, and
even it seems to be made in passing. It is almost as if the court of
appeal is not responding to arguments of counsel but rather merely
clearing up a question which might occur in the minds of future
readers.
Gazaway v. Nicholson, a Georgia case, also stands for the proposition
that adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine does not require
the abrogation of the rule which requires a joint verdict against jointly
negligent tortfeasors.123 However, in Gazaway, the primary concern of
the court was the application of comparative negligence to multi-de-
fendant cases.' 24 As to joint and several liability, the Georgia Supreme
Court added that "the mere fact that the same formula might produce
results which vary to some extent as to the individual defendants [de-
pending on whether defendants were sued jointly or separately] would
not within itself authorize the conclusion that the comparative-negli-
gence rule operated to change the common law rule as to joint ver-
dicts." 2 This ruling upholds joint and several liability in the sense
that there can be no joint and several liability unless there is a joint
verdict.
While Saucier v. Walker z6 does stand for the principle that "there
must be one verdict and that must be in one amount and against all the
joint tort-feasors found liable,"' 27 there is no mention of the existence
of comparative negligence as the basis for a challenge to joint and sev-
eral liability. It is true that comparative negligence was the law of Mis-
sissippi at the time Saucier was decided, and this case does include the
following quotation: "It is the settled law of this state that there can be
122. 31 N.Y.2d at 30, 286 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
123. 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154. An action was brought on the behalf of a seven year old boy,
who was struck by an automobile after exiting a school bus, against the driver of the automobile
which hit him, the driver of the school bus, and the owner of the bus. The defendants were sued
as joint tortfeasors.
124. It may be true that in such case the rule as to comparative negligence cannot in every
instance be applied in favor of each separate defendant to the same extent as if one party
only had been sued, the argument here being that in the former case the plaintiffs negli-
gence must be compared with the combined negligence of all the defendants considered
as a unit, whereas in the latter case, only the one and sole defendant can be treated as the
unit of comparison.
190 Ga. at 348, 9 S.E.2d at 156.
125. 190 Ga. at 348, 9 S.E.2d at 156.
126. 203 So. 2d 299 (Miss. 1967).
127. Id at 302-03.
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no apportionment of damages against a joint tort-feasor ... 128 Yet,
this quotation is merely used as grounds to construe an ambiguous jury
verdict.' 2 9
The last two cases cited in American Motorcycle, Walker v. Kroger 3 '
and Chille v. Howell,'3 ' are related in that Chille follows Walker. They
both stand for the proposition that the comparative negligence doctrine
does not require the demise of joint and several liability. 132 However,
the practical effect of the form of comparative negligence which existed
in Wisconsin at that time was to modify joint and several liability.
Wisconsin followed the form of comparative negligence which barred
the plaintiff from recovery where his negligence was "as great as" the
defendant's. 133 Therefore, if the plaintiffs negligence was greater than
one tortfeasor's, then there was no recovery whatsoever from that
tortfeasor: "If such contributory negligence was as great as the negli-
gence of one of the tort-feasors against whom recovery is sought, then
as to that particular tort-feasor there still is no right to recover."' 134
This position, established in Walker, was later reaffirmed in Chille, 135
and it solves one of the injustices which results from joint and several
liability. A defendant who is less liable than the plaintiff should not
have to pay the damages caused by all the defendants.
2. Cases Not Cited in American Motorcycle
There are additional cases which refuse to abolish the doctrine of
joint and several liability despite the existence of comparative negli-
gence. Lincenberg v. Issen 136 is the Florida equivalent of American Mo-
torcycle: the Florida Supreme Court had adopted comparative
negligence in Hoffman v. Jones,137 and Lincenberg was the court's first
opportunity to apply the comparative approach to multiple tortfeasors.
128. 1d (citing Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 850, 50 So. 2d 572, 577
(1951)).
129. In Saucier, the jury returned a verdict which was unclear as to whether three defendants
were to pay $5000 each, for a total of $15,000, or $5,000 together. The court used the quotation
above as a basis for holding that the verdict was for $5,000 against all three defendants as joint
tortfeasors.
130. 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
131. 34 Wis. 2d 491, 149 N.W.2d 600 (1967).
132. This holding was reaffirmed in Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 67 Wis.
2d 321, 227 N.W.2d 444 (1975).
133. Wis. STAT. §331.045 (1931) provided in part that, in connection with contributory negli-
gence, the negligence of the plaintiff would not bar recovery "if such negligence was not as great
as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought" and that "any damages allowed
shall be diminished by the jury in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering." ld
134. 214 Wis. at 536, 252 N.W. at 727-28.
135. 34 Wis. 2d at 500, 149 N.W.2d at 604.
136. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
137. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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The court held that it was bound by the legislature's recent adoption of
the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.1 38 The court
held that the will of the legislature should prevail; since the statute act
expressly provided for the continued existence of joint and several lia-
bility, then this doctrine should continue to be the law of Florida. It
should be noted that the court also declined to apportion contribution
among tortfeasors according to fault because the statute expressly pro-
vides for pro rata contribution.139
In Colorado, one appellate court has held with little discussion that
the Colorado rule ofjoint and several liability and the rule of no contri-
bution among tortfeasors should continue to be the law. Although the
court noted the existence of American Motorcycle, there was little dis-
cussion of it: the court simply noted that such a change "is not within
the province of this court." 40 However, there is a vigorous dissent sup-
porting both contribution based upon proportional fault' 4' and the ab-
rogation of joint and several liability.' 42
In Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, the Supreme Court of Alaska
refused to abandon the doctrine despite recognizing that it places the
entire burden of an insolvent defendant on those defendants who can
pay. 14 3 The court reasoned that even the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act only suggested modification of the doctrine' 44 and that the two
138. During the pendency of the appeal, the Florida Legislature passed FLA. STAT. §768.31
(1975), which was signed into law by the governor on June 13, 1975. The Florida statute was an
adoption of the UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTF.AsoRs AcT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975) (1955
version).
139. 318 So. 2d at 394. "The negligence attributed to the defendants will then be apportioned
on a pro rata basis without considering relative degrees of fault although the multi-party defend-
ants will remain jointly and severally liable for the entire amount." 1d
140. Stefanich v. Martinez, 570 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1977).
141. 570 P.2d at 555.
142. Id at 555-57.
143. 605 P.2d 426, 432 (Alaska 1979).
144. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT §2, 12 U.L.A. 33, 38 (Supp. 1982) (Commissioners'
Comment: Joint and Several Liability and Equitable Shares of the Obligation). The common law
rule ofjoint-and-several liability ofjoint tortfeasors continues to apply under this Act. This is true
whether the claimant was contributorily negligent or not. The plaintiff can recover the total
amount of his judgment against any defendant who is liable.
The judgment for each claimant also sets forth, however, the equitable share of the total obliga-
tion to the claimant for each party, based on his established percentage of fault. This indicates the
amount that each party should eventually be responsible for as a result of the rules of contribu-
tion. Stated in the judgment itself, it makes the information available to the parties and will
normally be a basis for contribution without the need for a court order arising from motion or
separate action.
Reallocation. Reallocation of the equitable share of the obligation of a party takes place when
his share is uncollectible.
Reallocation takes place among all parties at fault. This includes a claimant who is contribu-
torily at fault. It avoids the unfairness both of the common law rule at joint-and-several liability,
which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility upon the solvent defendants, and of a rule abol-
ishing joint-and-several liability, which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility upon the claim-
ant." Id The suggested modification of the Act is discussed infra note 173 and accompanying
text.
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other important jurisdictions-Florida in Lincenberg and California in
American Motorcycle-which had considered this issue rejected any
change in the doctrine.'45 The court concludes that the doctrine should
not be "modified."' 46 Although the term "modified" is used and there
is mention of the suggested approach of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, the bulk of the court's discussion deals with the subject of
abrogation.
Although most of the cases discussed above-both those cited in
American Motorcycle and those which are not-have some preceden-
tial value in support of the continued existence of joint and several lia-
bility, none of them, except Arctic Structures, even mention
modification. None of them fully discuss the possibility of modifica-
tion, much less attempt to come to grips with the problem of the settling
or insolvent tortfeasor. Even Walker and Chille which do in effect
modify the doctrine of joint and several liability, merely state a conclu-
sion without real discussion. Failure to abolish a law does not mean it
should not be modified; indeed, when someone is arguing abolition and
the courts are resisting, perhaps modification is the moderate step
which should be taken.
B. States Abolishing or Modfy'ing Joint and Several Liability
Although the thrust of this article is not to advocate the abolition of
joint and several liability, it should be noted that several jurisdictions
have abolished the doctrine as being incompatible with comparative
negligence. The court in American Motorcycle implies that it knew of
these cases when it stated that "the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions which have adopted comparative negligence have retained the
joint and several liability doctrine.""' 7 However, the tone of the court
is such that it seems to be saying that no rational mind which has con-
sidered this issue has ever found any contradiction between the doc-
trine of joint and several liability and the fairness principle which lies
behind comparative negligence. 141
Three states-Vermont, Kansas, and New Hampshire-have abol-
ished joint and several liability using similar statutory language:
Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant each
145. 605 P.2d at 432-35.
146. 605 P.2d at 435.
In light of Alaska's existing pro rata legislative scheme for apportionment or damages among
joint tortfeasors and the public policies implemented by the legislation, we hold that the common
law rule of joint and several liability should not be judicially modified.
Id [footnotes omitted]; see State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 547 n.42 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing that
judicial adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence will require legislative amendment).
147. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
148. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar
amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal
negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributable to all the
defendants against whom recovery is allowed. 149
In Kansas, this language was challenged on the grounds that, since
the term "joint and several liability" was not mentioned, the statute did
not really abolish the doctrine. The Supreme Court of Kansas met this
challenge with the unequivocal statement that
[Ujnder the provisions of K.S.A. 60-258a the concept of joint and
several liability between joint tort-feasors previously existing in this
state no longer applies in comparative negligence actions. The indi-
vidual liability of each defendant for payment of damages will be
based on proportionate fault, and among joint judgment debtors is
no longer required in such cases.150
Several states have modified the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity. Texas has limited the doctrine by a statute which states that a de-
fendant who is less liable than the plaintiff will only be liable for his
proportional share.151 This modification has been held by the courts to
apply only to situations in which the defendants have all been negligent
and not to situations in which one defendant was strictly liable.152 Ne-
vada has adopted an approach similar to that of Texas, 53 although it is
interesting to note that prior to 1979 the Nevada comparative negli-
gence statute took an even stronger position, holding that multiple de-
fendants were severally liable.1 54 Finally, Minnesota has adopted the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act with its provisions for sharing the bur-
dens of the settling or insolvent tortfeasor between culpable plaintiff
and the other defendants. 155
149. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1036 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507:7-a (1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §60-258b (1976) (substantially identical to the quoted language).
150. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 204, 580 P.2d 867, 875 (1978); accord, Wilson v. Probst, 224
Kan. 459, 581 P.2d 380 (1978).
151. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §2(c) (Vernon 1982-83) provides that:
Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the judgment
awarded the claimant, except that defendant whose negligence is less than that of the
claimant is liable to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment which represents
the percentage of the negligence attributable to him.
152. Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) Pyramid Derrick and
Equip. Co. v. Mason, 617 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
153. NEV. REV. STAT. §41.141.
154. 1979 NEV. STAT. C. 629, § 6, at 1356-57 stated in part that:
Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant in such an action:
(a) The defendants are severally liable to the plaintiff.(b) Each defendant's liability shall be in proportion to his negligence as determined by
the jury, or judge if there is no jury. The jury or judge shall apportion the recoverable
damages among the defendants in accordance with the negligence determined.
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. §604.02(a) provides in part that:
Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is entered, the court shall
determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollecti-
ble from that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other par-
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V. THE METHODS OF MODIFICATION: THE UNIFORM
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
The fairness principle requires that loss should be apportioned ac-
cording to the percentage of fault.156 Because of the changes which
have been made in the law in Li and American Motorcycle, this princi-
pal is very much embodied in California tort law.' 57 However, because
of the existence of joint and several liability, the embodiment of this is
not complete. Defendants still unfairly bear the burden of that portion
of the loss attributable to settling tortfeasors beyond the amount of
their settlements or to insolvent tortfeasors.
Those arguments which were used in American Motorcycle to justify
the continued existence of the doctrine of joint and several liability do
not negate the argument that the inequitable effects of the doctrine
should be modified. Indeed, some of the reasons given in American
Motorcycle against abolition actually favor modification. Moreover, as
demonstrated in the previous section, a number of jurisdictions have
seen fit to change the law in this area because of the fairness principle.
And, in this section which deals primarily with the form that modifica-
tion should take, it will be apparent that there is additional persuasive
authority in support of modification.
Whatever new form the law takes, it must fairly apportion the bur-
den of the unsatisfied portion of the loss between the defendants and
the culpable plaintiff. If this is not entirely possible, the law must find
other trade-offs which help to balance any inequity which remains.
Fortunately, suggestions for new approaches which more fully embody
the fairness principle have been made, and if the Supreme Court of
California was unimpressed by the persuasive authority in favor of
abolishing joint and several liability, the reverse should be true here.
These suggestions have been made by the commissioners of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and notable
ties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. A
party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any con-
tinuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
156. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
157. The current status of the law of comparative fault in California may be summarized
as follows: (I) the doctrine of comparative fault will be applied to a single plaintiff-
single defendant situation, including products liability cases; (2) comparative fault prin-
ciples will be utilized to ascertain percentages of fault in situations involving multiple
tortfeasors; (3) equitable indemnity will in fact provide proportionate contribution be-
tween or among multiple defendants; (4) named defendants may file a cross-complaint
against unnamed potential defendants for partial indemnity; (5) the concept of joint and
several liability has been retained; and (6) good faith settlements will be givenpro tanto
or dollar-for-dollar effect. It is unfortunate that some of these rules fail to carry out the
"fairness" principle of Li.
Adams, Settlements,4fter Li- But Is It "Fair"? 10 PAC. L.J. 729, 742-43 (1979).
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scholars 58 in the form of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act 5 9 which
proposed changes in the tort system resolving the problems of both the
insolvent and the settling tortfeasors.
A. The Problem of the Insolvent Torfeasor
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act corrects the problem of insol-
vency by having the culpable plaintiff and the solvent tortfeasors share
the burden of the damages which would be apportioned to the insol-
vent tortfeasor. Section 2(d) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
states as follows:
Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is en-
tered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equi-
table share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and
shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties,
including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percent-
ages of fault. The party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless
subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to claimant on
the judgment.160
In practice, the statute would work something like this. Assume






If defendant A was insolvent, any of the other defendants could move
for a reallocation of the judgment among the two remaining defendants
andplaintff. The liability of A would be apportioned according to the
relative fault of the remaining parties. Plaintiff would have to absorb
1/, defendant B /, and defendant C /2 of the $20,000 liability of A.
$5,000 will be allocated to plaintiff, $5,000 to B, and $10,000 to C.
Plaintiff's total recovery will be $75,000. Each one of the defendants
may be subject to pay the entire judgment under the doctrine of joint
and several liability, but each may seek contribution from the other.
There has been an equitable apportionment of the burden of the insol-
vent tortfeasor.
Since the jury will determine the proportional fault of all the parties,
the motion for reallocation can be made at the time of the trial if the
insolvency of a defendant is known then or when this insolvency comes
158. See Adams, supra note 157; Fleming, upra note 94.
159. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1983).
160. Id §2(d), at 37 (Supp. 1982).
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to light but not later than one year after the judgment is entered.' 6'
The rationale for the reallocation is simple: reallocation requires
plaintiff and defendants to share the burden of the loss attributable to
an insolvent tortfeasor. In the Comment to the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, the Commissioners make the following statement: "Reallo-
cation. . .avoids the unfairness both of the common law rule at joint-
and-several liability, which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility
upon the solvent defendants, and a rule abolishing joint-and-several
liability which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility upon the
claimant."' 62
Moreover, as pointed out by Justice Clark in his dissent in American
Motorcycle, any other approach besides reallocation will distort the
fact finding process. Often the insolvency of one defendant will be
known at the trial; this defendant may be absent from the suit entirely
or, because of insolvency, unrepresented at trial. Under the present
system plaintiff will seek to increase the portion of liability apportioned
to the insolvent defendant because plaintiff knows that the solvent de-
fendant will be responsible for the damages attributable to the insol-
vent one. If joint and several liability was abolished, the opposite
would be true: defendant would seek to enlarge the portion of fault
attributable to the insolvent defendant knowing plaintiff will be respon-
sible. Reallocation would put an end to this process. There would be
no incentive to inflate the liability of the insolvent defendant. 63
The rule of reallocation may not appeal to members of the plaintiffs'
bar because at present plaintiffs can always recover the full amount of
the judgment as long as there is one solvent judgment debtor. How-
ever, this solution would provide the Supreme Court of California an
opportunity to further embue the personal injury system with the fair-
ness principle. In American Motorcycle, the court significantly ad-
vanced the fairness principle, however, it stopped short when further
change meant shifting the entire burden of the uncollectible judgment
to the plaintiff. Reallocation is a moderate solution, and it completely
embodies the fairness principle."6
161. This concept of reallocation is not new, indeed it has been adopted in some common law
jurisdictions. Professor John G. Fleming credits Gregory in C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss
DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 77-79 (1936), as the originator of reallocation and cites
two common law jurisdictions which use some form of reallocation. Republic of Ireland's Civil
Liability Act of 1961, 1961 Acts of the Oiregchtas, ch. 41 §38; cf. South Africa's Apportionment of
Damages Act of 1956, ch. 2, § 8(ii) (redistribution between solvent joint wrongdoers). Flemming,
supra note 94, at 1492.
162. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35, 40 (Supp. 1983) (commissioners' com-
ment to section 2).
163. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 614, 578 P.2d at 923, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
164. In establishing the reallocation principle of the Uniform Act it would be possible to ex-
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B. The Settling Tor/feasor
At present a non-settling tortfeasor must bear the burden of that por-
tion of loss attributable to a settling tortfeasor which exceeds the
amount of the settlement. A release given in return for a settlement
will bar any further recovery from the settler. Only the amount of a
good faith settlement is deducted from the judgment regardless of the
settler's proportional fault.1 65 The doctrine of joint and several liability
requires that the non-settling defendants pay the entire remainder of
the judgment. A plaintiff who settles risks nothing as long as there is
another solvent defendant.
The fairness principle requires that liability be apportioned accord-
ing to fault. There are a number of ways the fairness principle could be
applied to remove this burden from the exclusive responsibility of non-
settling defendants. However, in this situation, the fairness principle
must be balanced against the policy which favors settlement between
the parties as the most efficient way to resolve disputes.
1. Shifting Burden to Settler
One possible way to implement the fairness principle is to shift the
burden to the settling tortfeasor. The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act of 1939166 took this approach: a settling tortfeasor "re-
mained liable for contribution in the amount by which his share ex-
ceeded the dollar value of the settlement."1 67
Although the 1939 Act did not contemplate a comparative fault sys-
tem, its approach would work, and indeed this approach would best
embody the fairness principle. For example, if the judgment was for
$100,000 and defendant A, who had settled for $20,000, was 40 percent
at fault, defendant B who had satisfied $80,000 of the judgment
($100,000 less the $20,000 settlement) could receive a $20,000 contribu-
tion from A. Ultimately both would be liable for the loss in proportion
to their fault. If such a system were established today, there would be
no injustice created by joint and several liability. A non-settling de-
fendant who had to satisfy the entire judgment would have an action
empt from reallocation those situations in which one defendant would be vicariously liable for the
damage caused by another under agency principles. The policies which make a master responsi-
ble for the conduct of the servant do not conflict with the fairness principle. The fairness principle
is most applicable to situations in which defendants and plaintiffs are all the concurrent cause of
plaintifrs injury.
165. 20 Cal. 3d at 602-04, 578 P.2d at 914-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197-99.
166. UNIF. CONTRIBUTrIoN AMONG TORT FEASORS AcT (1939).
167. Fleming, supra note 94, at 1494. Three states presently follow this approach: Arkansas,
Hawaii, and South Dakota. However, five other states adopted this approach at one time: Dela-
ware, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Adams, supra note 157, at 744
n.104.
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against the settler for the amount of the settler's liability exceeding the
settlement.
The problem with this approach is that it discourages settlement.
Why should any defendant settle if there is nothing to prevent him
from being responsible for the full amount of the judgment that he
would have to pay if he did not settle? 168 It would seem that the need
to encourage settlements is as great today, especially in terms of over-
crowded court calendars, as it was in 1955 when the Commissioner of
the Uniform Laws rejected this approach in favor of the present system
which provides for complete discharge of the settling tortfeasor and
reduces plaintiff's recovery against other defendants by the amount of
the settlement. 1
69
2. Shifting the Burden to Plaintff
The approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is to shift the
burden of the outstanding portion of the settling tortfeasor's liability to
the plaintiff. The Act uses its provisions governing release to shift the
burden:
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a
claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability
for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable
upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the
releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the
released person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Section 2.170
If a $100,000 judgment is apportioned with plaintiff 25% at fault, with
defendant A, (who had settled for $5,000) 25% at fault, and with de-
fendant B 50% at fault, plaintiff may recover only $50,000 from B. A is
completely discharged, and his or her equitable share of the liability,
$25,000, is subtracted from the total amount, $75,000, which plaintiff
can recover.
Beyond the fact that this approach is supported by the Commission-
ers, the rationale for the Uniform Act is appealing even though it does
not completely embody the fairness principle. Plaintiff is the master of
his or her fate free to settle or not depending upon the value he or she
places on the suit. Joint and several liability will still be available to
168. One small benefit might be that the settling defendant would not be jointly liable for the
other defendant's share; however, this would hardly provide the encouragement that is now given
defendants who know they will suffer no liability beyond the amount of the settlement.
169. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT FEAsORs AcT §4(b), 12 U.L.A. 63, 98 (1975). See
CAL. CIr. CODE §877(a).
170. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs AcT §6, 12 U.L.A. 35,44 (Supp. 1983) (em-
phasis added).
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assist plaintiff to recover the loss, and the tortfeasor who is "entirely
liable" can seek contribution on a comparative basis against anyone
but the settling tortfeasor. Moreover, there is no reason for a collusive
settlement. As Professor Fleming has noted, "this self-regulatory in-
centive is clearly more effective than the requirement of 'good faith'
under the current California statute and the Uniform Contribution
Act." 171
However, this form of apportionment does not fulfill the require-
ments of the fairness doctrine that liability should be apportioned ac-
cording to fault. Plaintiff will bear a disproportionate share of the loss,
and indeed, an innocent plaintiff may have to bear a portion of the loss
where now he would not bear any loss. While it is true that plaintiff
"has bought his peace,"' t72 this approach seems harsh, especially on the
innocent plaintiff since it is the innocent plaintiff who is least able to
protect against loss.
Plaintiff, knowing that he or she will have no opportunity to recover
the entire amount of loss after settlement, will certainly be more reluc-
tant to settle. However, the disincentive to settle is somewhat mitigated
under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act since plaintiff will be able
to keep any portion of the settlement which is above the actual liability
of the settler. Yet, the possibility that plaintiff may lose a portion of
damages will insure the opposition of the plaintiffs' bar to any legis-
lated change in the law.
However, taking into account all the policies that are relevant to this
subject, the approach of the Uniform Act is better than either the pres-
ent system or a regression to the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act. The present system encourages
settlement, but it flys in the face of the fairness principle. The position
of the 1939 Act, if used in a comparative system, would completely
embody the fairness principle; however, it would strongly discourage
settlement. The Uniform Act balances the two positions in that it
maintains the incentive for defendant to settle and it embodies the fair-
ness principle at least to the degree that plaintiff does not have to swal-
low any more of his own loss than he bargained for. 173
171. Fleming, supra note 94, at 1496.
172. Id at 1498.
173. It is also possible to modify the present system so that it can embody the fairness princi-
ple even more than under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act yet not reduce plaintifis incentive
to settle. the approach would be very similar to that used by the Uniform Act to apportion the
liability of an insolvent tortfeasor except there would be no need of the one year waiting period.
Since the amount of any settlement is known at the time the judgment is pronounced, the portion
of the settling defendants' liability which exceeds the settlement could be apportioned among all
parties who are at fault including plaintiff.
For example, assume the proportionate liability was as follows:
1983 / Joint and Several Liability
VI. CONCLUSION
After Li and American Motorcycle Association, the California tort
system has embodied the principle that plaintiff's loss should be appor-
tioned among all parties, including a culpable plaintiff. However, be-
cause of the doctrine of joint and several liability upheld in American
Motorcycle, the fairness principle does not control situations involving
settling or insolvent tortfeasors. In those situations defendants are
presently required to satisfy any portion of plaintiffs loss which are
outstanding because of insolvency or settlement. The present system
can be easily modified so that any unsatisfied loss can be apportioned




If the judgment was $100,000, defendant A's proportional share would be $40,000. However, if A
had settled for $25,000, there would be $15,000 which would fall upon the shoulders of one of the
other parties. Because of the doctrine ofjoint and several liability under present California law, B
could be required to pay both his $40,000 and the $15,000 which A avoided by settlement. Under
the approach of the Uniform Contribution Act of 1939, B, he satisfied the entire $55,000, could
seek contribution from A for $15,000. In contrast, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act would
require plaintiff to bear this burden. A would be discharged from all further liability and B would
be liable only for his own $40,000.
But the most equitable method of resolving this situation is for the $15,000 to be apportioned
between the plaintiff and defendant B. The ratio of B's liability to plaintiffs is two to one. There-
fore, defendant B would have to pay for two-thirds of A's proportional liability-S 10,000. De-
fendant B's liability would total $50,000. Plaintiff would have to absorb $5,000 of the loss as the
price of settlement. As noted above, this apportionment could be made at trial, since the amount
of the settlement is known then.
Of all the methods of solving the problem of the settling tortfeasor this one best embodies the
fairness principle while still encouraging settlement. Joint and several liability still exists to assist
the plaintiff in recovering judgment, but the inequity created by the doctrine will be greatly less-
ened. All culpable parties except the settling defendant are liable in proportion to fault. It is
possible to establish a system in which a settling defendant would also have to share in the divi-
sion of the portion of his liability which exceeds the settlement. In the hypo discussed above
defendant A would be responsible for 2/5 of the outstanding $15,000 or $6,000, defendant B
would also be responsible for 2/5 or $6,000. Plaintiffs share would be 1/5 or $3,000. The disad-
vantage of this method is that it would discourage settlement. Defendants settle not only to avoid
greater liability but also to avoid the costs of defense. If the settling defendant may still be liable
for some damages, both plaintiff and the remaining defendant will attempt to increase the settler's
liability, and they may be successful since the settler will not be present to defend himself. In this
situation a defendant may not want to be absent from trial. The settling defendant is completely
discharged only to preserve the incentive to settle.
Both plaintiffs and defendants will be encouraged to settle under this system. Although plain-
tiffs will not benefit as much as they do under the present system, they will know that they will not
be responsible for the entire amount of damages which exceeds the amount of the settlement.
Since in most cases plaintiff will be less culpable than remaining defendants, the plaintiff's share
will be small. Defendants will want to settle because of the complete discharge which results.
Moreover, as each defendant settles, the pressure will be on the remaining defendants to settle
since they will be partially responsible for the outstanding portion of the settler's share. Also, the
Supreme Court in American Motorcycle established that it valued the rationale of favoring the
innocent plaintiffover the culpable defendant, 20 Cal. 3d at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 189, the form of apportionment suggested here embodies this rationale since the innocent plain-
tiff will not have to bear any portion of the loss attributable to a settling defendant.
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